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ON THE IRRELEVANCE OF COLLUSION IN PERFECTLY 
CORRELATED ENVIRONMENTS 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
ABSTRACT 
I study a class of agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an underlying 
organizational hierarchy. Specifically, I analyze a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy, and I show that 
when the private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy across 
the two forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion by the players notwithstanding, the 
principal can always implement the full information optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 
JEL Classification: C72, D82 
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ON THE IRRELEVANCE OF COLLUSION IN PERFECTLY 
CORRELATED ENVIRONMENTS! 
1. Introduction 
The setting of many agency problems in economics involves the analysis of an organizational 
hierarchy. Consider the problem of designing an international environmental agreement (lEA); this 
problem has been studied by Barrett (1994), Batabyal (1996, 1997, 1998a), and Bernauer (1995). 
This mechanism design question cannot be analyzed meaningfully without studying the hierarchical 
interactions of three players. These three players include a relevant international institution (the 
principal), national governments (the intermediaries) and polluting firms (the agents) in the various 
countries? As a second example, consider the problem of designing effective rural wage 
compensation schemes, a problem that has been studied by Bardhan (1984), Basu (1992), and 
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985), among others. Here the relevant design problem once again involves 
the analysis of a hierarchy; this hierarchy consists of an absentee landlord (the principal), village 
level supervisors (the intermediaries), and village tenants (the agents).3 
II acknowledge fmancial support from the Faculty Research Grant program at Utah State University and the 
Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322-4810, by way of grant UTA 024. 
Approved as journal paper No. 6085. I thank Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jacques Lawarree for providing me with access 
to their unpublished work. I alone am responsible for the contents of this paper. 
2Note that it is not possible to dispense with the government function. In designing an lEA, international 
institutions interact with national governments directly and with polluting fIrms only indirectly. As such, any 
meaningful analysis of the lEA design question must analyze the role of national governments. 
31 have in mind situations in which it is not possible-or possible only at great cost-to do away with the 
supervisory function. 
J 
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In addition to the existence of an explicit organizational hierarchy, these kinds of problems 
are characterized by two other attributes which deserve some comment. 4 First, the players occupying . 
the second and the third tiers of the hierarchy typically possess private information about some 
aspect of the underlying problem. In the first example above, governments and firms in the 
individual countries can be expected to possess private information about the available pollution 
abatement technology. In the second example, the village tenants will have private information 
about their productivity. As a result, if the underlying hierarchy contains more than one fork, i.e., 
more than one vertical structure, then the question of possible correlation in the private information 
of the players across the forks is relevant. Second, whenever the principal grants some authority to 
another player in the hierarchy, that player may choose to exercise the authority for a purpose other 
than the one intended by the principal. In other words, potential collusion by the players occupying 
the second and the third tiers of the hierarchy becomes an issue. With regard to my earlier examples, 
governments and firms within a country may collude to thwart the objectives of an international 
institution,5 or tenants and supervisors within a village may collude to the detriment of the absentee 
landlord. 
Given this background, I propose to extend the hierarchies literature by formally analyzing 
a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy with five players. Specifically, I shall show that when the 
private information of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy across the two 
4p or other examples involving the analysis of hierarchies, see Tirole (1994), and Laffont and Martirnort (1996). 
5See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible governmentlfmn collusion in an 
international setting. 
/ 
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forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion notwithstanding, the principal can always 
implement the full information optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. 
In other words, in perfectly correlated environments, the principal can engage in relative 
performance evaluation to effectively extract all the surplus from the players in the second and the 
third tiers of the two-forked hierarchy. To comprehend the assumption of perfect correlation, recall 
the two examples discussed above. With regard to the first example, I have in mind polluting firms 
in countries with very similar pollution abatement technologies (Norway and Sweden). In this 
situation, the random variables denoting the private information regarding the quality of the two 
pollution abatement technologies can be thought of as being perfectly correlated. With regard to the 
second example, I have in mind villages located close to each other. In this setting, the impact of 
land quality, rainfall, etc., is likely to affect the productivities of crop-growing tenants in any two 
villages very similarly. Thus, the private information about tenant productivity in the two villages 
can be expected to be very strongly correlated. Suppose that the main function of the player 
occupying the second tier of the hierarchy is that of monitoring and then reporting the results of such 
monitoring to the principal. 6 Then the private information of these two players can be expected to 
be strongly correlated as well. Going back to my two examples, intermediaries in similar countries 
and in similar villages can be expected to have access to monitoring equipment that is of comparable 
quality. As a result, the random variables denoting the stochastic outcome of monitoring in the two 
countries or villages will be strongly correlated. 
6Several papers have adopted this approach. For instance, see Kofman and Lawarree (1993, 1995). The reader 
should note that monitoring/reporting need not be the main function. Later in this section, I shall provide examples in 
which other tasks are more important. 
/ 
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In an environment of perfect correlation, multiple equilibria-a major issue in many agency 
models-pose no problems and hence attention can be restricted to contracts that can be 
implemented by the principal in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. As such, issues of augmentation 
(MookheIjee and Reichelstein 1990) or the design of equivalent dominant strategy mechanisms 
(MookheIjee and Reichelstein 1992) are not relevant. 
Sappington and Demski (1983) have studied ex pose contracting in a two-tiered hierarchy 
with two states of nature and perfectly correlated private information. They show that the full 
information optimum can be implemented by the principal in a dominant strategy equilibrium. 
Three-tiered hierarchies with a single fork have been studied by Tirole (1986), Demski and 
Sappington (1987), and Kofman and Lawarree (1993). These researchers have studied the properties 
of the ex post equilibrium contract governing the interaction between a single principal, a single 
intermediary (often a boss or a manager), and a single agent. Demski and Sappington (1987) and 
Kofman and Lawarree (1993) assume that monitoring is possible whereas Tirole (1986) assumes that 
monitoring is impossible. 
In this paper, I have three objectives. First, I shall investigate the robustness of the 
Sappington and Demski (1983) result by analyzing a model with an expanded state space and an 
increased number of tiers. As indicated in the introductory paragraph to this paper, the principal 
purpose of this paper is to analyze agency problems that are characterized by the existence of an 
organizational hierarchy. In these problems, the hierarchical nature of the interaction between the 
various players is what is of interest. As such, it is not possible to dispense with the middle tier and 
7By ex post I mean a situation in which some players acquire their private information before contracting. 
/ 
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meaningfully analyze such problems. Two examples of these kinds of problems were provided 
earlier. Many other examples of such three-tiered hierarchies come to mind. In the context of a 
manufacturing firm, a commonly existing hierarchy is that of the manager/foreman/worker. In the 
context of defense procurement, the typical hierarchy is that of the Defense Department/ 
contractor(s)/subcontractor(s). Finally as a third example, consider the shareholder/manager/worker 
hierarchy. In all of these examples, the second tier is an essential component of the hierarchy. The 
manager cannot ignore the foreman, the Defense Department typically does not deal with 
subcontractors directly, and shareholders do not interact with workers directly. 
Due to the relevance of the second tier, and because the players in the second and the third 
tiers of the hierarchy possess private information, the possibility of collusion by some of these 
players emerges. National governments and polluting firms within a country may collude against 
an international institution, the foreman and the worker may collude to the detriment of a manager, 
and in the context of defense procurement, contractors and subcontractors may collude. 
Consequently, a significant part of my analysis will consist of analyzing the properties of collusion-
proof contracts. 
Second, I shall study the vertical and horizontal interaction effects that arise from the perfect 
correlation in the private information of the second- and the third-tier players in this more general 
model. Third, I shall discuss some conditions under which the first best implementation result of 
Sappington and Demski (1983) ~nd that of this paper does not hold. The reader will note that in a 
sense, this paper extends the multiagent contract theory literature vertically and the hierarchies 
literature laterally. Specifically, I shall study ex post contracting between a single principal, two 
intermediaries and two agents. The principal's task is to design an incentive compatible, and 
/ 
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collusion-proof contract, which will extract all the surplus from the intermediaries and the agents 
in the two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy. I shall focus on the case in which the private information 
of the intermediaries and the agents in the two forks of the hierarchy is perfectly correlated. In this 
setting, I shall demonstrate the power of relative performance evaluation. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe the model in detail and 
then I characterize the first best or full information optimum. In section 3, I analyze the above-
described hierarchy with possible collusion by intermediaries and agents in the two forks of the 
hierarchy. In section 4, I offer some concluding comments. 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
2a. Description of the Model 
J 
Superscripts A and B will denote the two forks and subscripts i = 1, ... , 4 will refer to the 
state of nature. In what follows, I shall focus on forkA. The reader should note that although I am 
focussing on fork A, the analysis is identical for fork B. In particular, all the subsequent results for 
fork A can be obtained for fork B by simply interchanging the two superscripts. Let eA denote the 
uncertainty about agent productivity; eA has binary support [eAL,eAH], where eAH>eAL>o, and 
ileA=eAH- eAL. I shall refer to eAL as the low-productivity parameter and to eAH as the high-
productivity parameter. 
The risk-averse agent inA produces a good whose output and value in state i are denoted by x .A ~ 0. 
l 
The agent chooses action e.A > ° in state i. The agent's disutility of action is gee .A), with 
l l 
gl(e) > 0, gll(e) > 0, and g(O) = 0. This agent has a utility function U[T.~ - g(e .A)], with 
II l 
° < a U[ e ]/aT.~ < 00, \jT.~. T.~ ~ ° is the monetary transfer made by the principal to the A agent 
II II II 
7 
when he produces x .A and the B agent produces X .B. The A agent's reservation utility IS 
I I 
AA AA AA AA U U[ T ]; both U and the reservation transfer T are common knowledge. 
By employing a monitoring device, the risk-averse intermediary in A receives a signal ~ 
from the agent regarding his private information and then he (the intermediary) provides a report-,A 
to the principal indicating what he observes about the agent's productivity parameter. 8 In some 
states of nature, this monitoring device malfunctions and, hence, in these states the intermediary will 
be unable to provide the principal with a useful report. The intermediary has a strictly concave and 
differentiable utility function V( G .~), where G.~ is the monetary transfer made to the A intermediary 
II II 
when he reports rA and the B intermediary reports r .B. I assume that 0 < V i (G .~) < 00, VG .~. 
I I II II 
AA AA AA AA TheA intermediary's reservation utility is V = V( G ); both V and the reservation transfer G 
are common knowledge.9 
The principal is risk neutral and he has a profit function defined over goods that takes the 
form 1t = ~/(x 1 - G 1 - T I), 1 = A, B. Note that the output produced by the A agent is 
X A = e A + eA. As stated, the principal's profit is the difference between the total production of 
good x and the sum of the intermediary and the agent transfers. The principal designs the main 
contract, which he offers to the intermediary and the agent. This contract can only be conditioned 
on what the principal actually observes, i.e., the two intermediary reports -,A and,.s, and the two 
output levels .xA and xB. 
8Since my main objective is not to study monitoring, I shall assume that the use of this monitoring device is 
costless. 
9The reader will note that the analysis involves both forks. To see this, note that, inter alia, the transfers to the 
agent and the intermediary have two subscripts. The fIrst subscript corresponds to fork A and the second subscript 
corresponds to fork B. 
J 
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There are four states of nature, each state occumng with probability p . > 0, with 
I 
~\..I' p . = 1. The random variables eA and eB are perfectly correlated. The principal, the 
v i I 
intermediary and the agent in A sign the contract holding asymmetric information about eA. The 
contract is ex post, i.e., it is signed after the agent has observed eA. The agent always observes eA 
before choosing his action. The intermediary mayor may not observe the agent's private 
information. This depends on whether the intermediary's monitoring device functions or 
malfunctions. In other words, the intermediary's signal.r4 mayor may not be informative. I can 
now characterize the four states. They are: 
• State 1: eA I e~, e~ eBL SA I ' I eAL B I ' S I = eBL I ' 
• State 2: eA 2 e~, e~ eBL sA 2 ' 2 0;, s2B = O~, 
• State 3: eA 3 e~, e: eBH sA 3 ' 3 0:, s3B = 0:, 
• State 4: eA 4 e~, e! eBH SA 4 ' 4 eAH B eBH 4 ,S4 = 4 . 
In state 1, the agent and the intermediary in both forks observe the low productivity 
parameter and the intermediary monitoring devices function and hence provide useful information. 
In state 2, both agents observe the low productivity parameter, but the two intermediaries observe 
nothing. In this state, both intermediary monitoring devices malfunction. In state 3, the two agents 
observe the high productivity parameter, and, once again, the two intermediary monitoring devices 
malfunction. Finally, in state 4, agents and intermediaries in both forks observe the high 
productivity parameter. lO I shall assume that PI > P2 and that P4 > P3 . That is, the two 
10I have assumed that the intermediaries always know when their monitoring devices malfunction. More 
involved formulations in which the intermediaries do not know the states in which their monitoring devices have 
malfunctioned are possible. These alternate formulations require additional states, and additional constraints on the 
principal ' s problem; as such, these formulations make it difficult to obtain concrete results. 
/ 
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intermediary monitoring devices are reliable in the sense that they are more likely to function than 
to fail. The reader will note that the imperfect ~ature of the two monitoring devices results in two 
additional states, i.e., states 2 and 3. 
The timing of the principal/intermediary/agent game is as follows. First, nature reveals 8A 
to the agent and the intermediary receives his signal s4. Second, the principal offers the contract to 
the intermediary and to the agent. Third, the agent chooses action e4. Fourth, output x4 is produced 
by the agent and the intermediary sends his report ,-A to the principal, indicating what he observed. 
Fifth, the principal compensates the intermediary and the agent in A by making transfers 
In the remainder of this paper I shall suppose that the principal can verify the veracity of the 
report ,-A, when s4 = rr. That is, if s4 is noninformative, then the corresponding report ,-A reflects this 
fact and the principal can verify that the true facts are indeed as they have been reported. In 
symbols, SA =oA=>r A =oA. On the other hand, to keep the principal's problem interesting and to 
allow for the possibility of intermediary/agent collusion, I shall permit the intermediary to lie and 
report that his signal is noninformative when in fact such is not the case. 11 That is, 
s A=8A=>r AE{8A,oA}. This completes the description of my model. I now consider the benchmark 
case in which perfect information is acquired by the principal. 
2b. The First Best Optimum 
In this case, the principal observes 81 and the agent's action. When this happens, the 
lIThe reader will note that I have restricted the intermediary 's message space in certain states. Specifically, 
lying by the intermediary is restricted to states 1 and 4. Put differently, reporting the wrong state of nature is equivalent 
to obtaining a noninformative signal. A more general model with more states would permit lying in all four states. 
10 
principal bypasses the A intermediary and contracts with the A agent directly. Since this 
"A intermediary now has no role to play, he receives his reservation transfer G , and hence his 
reservation utility VA in all four states. The principal solves 
(1) 
The first-order necessary condition requires that 
(2) 
In other words, in the first best optimum, the marginal disutility of the action is set equal to the 
marginal profit. The optimal action e A is the same in all states of nature. The agent receives a 
* 
transfer which is independent of the state. This transfer equals t A + g *' where g * = g( e *A). I can now 
define the full-informationlfirst-best optimum. 
Definition: In the full-information optimum, (i) the intermediary and the agent in each fork are held 
J 
to their reservation utilities in all states, (ii) equation (2) holds, and (iii) the contract is Pareto 
efficient in every state. 
I now move on to the more interesting case in which the principal cannot determine either 
the realization of SA or the action undertaken by the A agent. 
3. Contracting with Intermediary/Agent Collusion 
Recall that the principal is unable to monitor the activities of intermediaries and agents in A 
and B. Since the principal can never acquire the agent's private information and must rely-in 
part--on the intermediary's report r4 to design the optimal contract, it is of considerable interest to 
determine the nature of the equilibrium contract that can be implemented by the principal when the 
11 
intennediary and the agent in A collude to maximize the total transfers to be received from the 
principal. 
I shall model collusion between the intennediary and the agent as follows. Before the 
revelation of 8A to the agent and at the time of signing the main contract, the agent and the 
intennediary in each fork sign a secondary contract which entails the offer and acceptance of a 
monetary bribe from the agent to the intennediary. Naturally, this secondary contract is 
unobservable by the principal. The bribe can only be conditioned on what the agent and the 
intennediary both observe, i.e., the bribe is a function of the intennediary's report y4 and the agent's 
output .xA . With the payment and receipt of the bribe, the agent's total transfer becomes 
{T A( • ) - b A(r A ,x A)} and the intennediary' s total transfer becomes {G A( • ) + b A(r A ,x A) }, where 
b A(r A,x A) is the bribe offered by the agent to the intennediary. I shall not be concerned with the 
question of how the surplus from the bribe is divided. For my purpose, it is only necessary that the 
bribe be paid by the agent to the intennediary. 
Collusion by the intennediary and the agent alters the incentives of the various parties but 
not- as we shall see- the nature of the optimal contract offered by the principal. To see why the 
agent in A might want to bribe the intennediary, consider state 4. In this state, the intennediary is 
indifferent between reporting that he has observed 8AH and reporting that he has observed ()A. The 
agent, on the other hand, would prefer that the intennediary report ()A. This is one instance in which 
a clear rationale exists for the agent to bribe the intennediary. 
In order to fonnulate and solve the principal's problem when there is collusion, I shall follow 
Tirole (1986, 1988). Tirole's method involves imposing constraints in addition to the usual 
/ 
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participation and incentive compatibility constraints. These additional constraints are designed to 
preclude intermediary/agent collusion and hence make the main contract collusion-proof. The 
solution concept that I am using in this paper is that of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Consequently, 
the reader should note that in this section I am considering simultaneous collusion in both forks. The 
equilibrium contract designed by the principal for A is collusion-proof on the assumption that if the 
resulting contract were not constrained to be collusion proof, intermediary/agent coalitions would 
form in both forks. The reader will note that this assumption of "simultaneous collusion" is weaker 
than the assumption that requires the contract for A to be collusion-proof whether or not there is 
collusion in B. 
I can now formulate the principal's problem. The principal solves12 
~ (A + SA _ G- A _ T- A) max A G-A T-A \.-I' p. e. . .. .., 
e j , ii' jj v i I I I II II 
(3) 
subject to (3a) -A A "A. U[ T .. - g ( e. )] ~ U , V 1, ( 3 b ) 
II I 
-A "A V(G .. ) ~ V ,Vi, (3c) 
II 
- A (A - A (A A sA () - A (A - A (A A sA ) ] ( ) p2[T22 - ge2)]~p2[T32-ge3+L1 )], 3dP3[T33-ge3)]~P3[T23-ge2-L1 ,3e 
P2[G2~ + f2~ -g(e/)]~p2[G3~ + T3~ -g(e3A +~SA)], (3f) P3[G3~ + f3~ -g(e3A)] ~P3[G2~ + f2~ -g(e2A _~SA)], 
(3g) Pl[Gl~+fl~-g(elA)]~p2[G2~+f2~-g(e2A)], and (3h) P4[G4~+f4~-g(e4A)] ~P3[G3~+~~-g(e/)]. 
The four constraints in (3a) and in (3b) are the agent and the intermediary ex post 
participation constraints. These constraints tell us that it must be individually rational for the agent 
and the intermediary to contract with the principal in every state. Constraints (3c) and (3d) are the 
agent's incentive compatibility constraints in states 2 and 3, respectively. These constraints arise 
because the principal has imperfect information about SA in these two states. Note that these are 
12The collusion-proof transfers to the intermediary and the agent will be denoted by G~ and fA, respectively. 
II II 
13 
also the states in which the intermediary's signal is noninformative. Constraint (3c) says that in state 
2, the agent should not claim that the state is 3. Similarly, (3d) tells us that in state 3, the agent 
should not claim that the state is 2. Constraint (3e) tells us that in state 2, the intermediary should 
not be able to bribe the agent to take action at the level that is appropriate for state 3. Similarly, (3f) 
tells us that the intermediary should not be able to bribe the agent to claim that the state is 2 when 
it is 3. Constraints (3g) and (3h) are the core collusion constraints. Recall that in states 1 and 4, the 
intermediary's signal s4 is informative. Thus in these two states, the intermediary can hide this fact. 
Given this, (3 g) and (3h) tell us that should the agent bribe the intermediary, then the total sum of 
the transfers less the disutility of action in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding totals 
in states 2 and 3, respectively. Solving the principal's problem (3) subject to (3a)-(3h), I can state 
Theorem 1: In the three-tiered hierarchy with intermediary/agent collusion, the principal can 
/ 
implement the full information optimum contract in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This contract has 
the following features: (i) e ,A =e A, Vi, (ii) G,~ =0 A, Vi, (iii) f,~ =T A +g , Vi, (iv) only the 
1 * II II * 
intermediary and the agent participation constraints bind, and (v) the equilibrium contract is Pareto 
efficient in all four states. 
Proof· See the Appendix. 
To intuitively verify that the contract specified in Theorem 1 is individually rational, 
incentive compatible, and collusion-proof, I shall proceed as follows. I have to show that the 
constraints (3a)-(3h) are satisfied. First, by part (iv) of the theorem, constraints (3a) and (3b) hold 
with equality. Hence the contract is individually rational for the intermediary and the agent. Second, 
-A -A -A -A because T23 , T32, G23 , and G32 are not arguments of the principal's profit function or the 
14 
intermediary and the agent utility functions, they can be set by the principal so as to ensure strict 
inequality in constraints (3c )-(3f). Hence the contract is incentive compatible for the intermediary 
and the agent. Finally, by parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the theorem and the reliability assumptions 
PI > P2 and P4 > P3 , we see that constraints (3g) and (3h) are also satisfied. Hence the contract 
is collusion-proof. 
To check that the contract specified in Theorem 1 does indeed implement the first best, recall 
the definition of the first-best optimum given in section 2b. First, note that the intermediary and the 
agent are held to their reservation utilities by part (iv) of the Theorem. Second, criterion (ii) of the 
definition is satisfied because part (i) of the theorem specifies that the first-best action will be taken 
in every state of nature. Finally, the fact that the contract is Pareto efficient in every state can be 
deduced from conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of the Theorem. 13 
If the principal does indeed offer the contract with the characteristics described in Theorem 
1, then his total monetary transfers cannot be altered by changing the intermediary's report or the 
agent's action. In other words, the principal can be sure that his monetary obligations will be those 
described in Theorem 1. This is because the equilibrium contract is collusion-proof. Alternately put, 
the principal offers the best contract possible from the set of feasible contracts that are constrained 
to be collusion-proof. 
Theorem 1 says that the principal can implement the full information optimum in a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium. This is a strong result and it tells us that the first-best implementation result of 
Sappington and Demski (1983) generalizes to three-tiered hierarchies. Indeed, we have seen that 
J3See the appendix for further details. 
/ 
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when the private information of the intermediaries and the agents in the two forks of the three-tiered 
hierarchy is perfectly correlated, collusion is irrelevant, and it essentially plays no role in the design 
of the equilibrium contract since none of the collusion or incentive compatibility constraints bind 
at the optimum. The "out of equilibrium" payments to the agent and the intermediary satisfy 
f2~ < [fA +g(e*A -i18A)], ~~ < [fA +g(e*A +i18A)], G2~ < [OA +fA -f2~ +g(e*A -i18A)], and 
G A < [0 A + fA - fA +g(e A + i18A)] 
32 32 * . 
The contract specified in Theorem 1 can be thought of as an incentive scheme, which 
effectively places the intermediaries and the agents in the two forks in Prisoner's Dilemma games. 
By carefully selecting the "out of equilibrium" transfers, the principal is able to ensure that 
misrepresentation of private information does not pay. As such, "telling the truth" is the unique 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the game for the intermediaries and the agents. Further, the equilibrium 
contract is Pareto efficient in every state, the first-best action is required in every state, and the 
transfers made to the intermediary and the agent are the same in all four states. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma game approach to deterring collusion described in this paper 
complements the existing literature on collusion in hierarchies. For instance, Kofinan and Lawarree 
(1995 hereafter KL) and Laffont and Martimort (1996, hereafter LM) have both studied hierarchies 
consisting of a principal, a supervisor (regulator in LM), and an agent (firm in LM). As in this paper, 
the occupants of the second and the third tiers of the hierarchy, i.e., the supervisor (regulator) and 
the agent (firm), may collude. KL show that in a number of circumstances, the principal can deter 
collusion by designing a Prisoner's Dilemma like mechanism. In this mechanism, a second 
supervisor is brought in, and the principal establishes incentives in such a way that these two 
supervisors end up policing each other. LM analyze the behavior of two collusive regulators. They 
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show that the regulators' access to information introduces increasing returns in the benefit from a 
side contract (in my case, the bribe) between a regulator and the firm. This fact enables the principal 
to design a mechanism that is similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma mechanism. In this mechanism, the 
principal deters collusion by separating the two collusive regulators. As a result, the information 
available to anyone regulator is reduced, the transaction costs of collusion increase, and social 
welfare rises. Unlike the scenario described in this paper, the KL and the LM papers are not 
concerned with correlation in the private information of supervisors (regulators) and agents (firms). 
This is because both of these papers are concerned with a single-forked hierarchy. Further, in the 
KL paper, both supervisors are identical and they have access to the same information. By explicitly 
analyzing a second fork, I have shown that the gains from the design of Prisoner's Dilemma type 
mechanisms can be realized in multiforked environments as well. 
The reader should note that recent research 14 suggests that the first-best implementation result 
of this paper and that of Sappington and Demski (1983) typically will not hold if the principal's 
problem is subject to constraints in addition to the participation, incentive compatibility, and 
collusion constraints. This tells us that the presence ofbudget balance or "yardstick" constraints can 
effectively preclude the principal from placing intermediaries and agents in situations like the 
Prisoner's Dilemma game. In other words, even in perfectly correlated environments, there are 
limits to the power of relative performance evaluation. 
14See Batabyal (1998b) for further details. 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper I have analyzed a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy. I focused on the case in 
which the private infonnation of the players in the second and in the third tiers of the hierarchy is 
perfectly correlated. I showed that in this setting, the principal loses nothing from his inability to 
monitor the actions of the intennediaries and the agents. Indeed, the principal can implement the 
full infonnationlfirst best optimum in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium even if the intennediaries and the 
agents collude. 
/ 
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Appendix15 
To verify Theorem 1, consider the contract specified by the theorem. In this contract, the 
-A "A -A "A 
equilibrium agent and intermediary transfers are T .. = T + g , Vi, and G.. = G ,Vi, 
II * II 
respectively. The "out of equilibrium" agent and intermediary transfers satisfy 
It is straightforward to verify that the optimal Bayes-Nash strategy for the agent and the 
intermediary in this contract is to always take the first-best action, and to always report the relevant 
information truthfully. To see why this is so, consider the following line of reasoning. 
First, payments of f.~ = t A + g to the agent and G A to the intermediary ensure that these two 
II * / 
players will participate in the contract. Hence, constraints (3a)-(3b) hold with equality and the 
contract is individually rational for both these players. 
-A - A - A - A Second, because T
23 , T32, G23 , and G32 do not enter the objective functions of any of the 
three players, these four "out of equilibrium" transfers can always be chosen by the principal so that 
all the incentive compatibility constraints-constraints (3c )-(3 f)-hold with strict inequality in 
equilibrium. Thus, the contract is incentive compatible. 
Third, under the terms of the contract described in the theorem, the agent always takes the 
first-best action and the intermediary always reports truthfully. These two features combined with 
the reliability assumptions, i.e., PI > P2 and P4 > P3 , tell us that the collusion 
15Details of the Kuhn-Tucker analysis involved in the proof of Theorem 1 are available from the author upon 
request. 
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constraints-constraints (3 g)-(3h)-also hold with strict inequality in equilibrium. Thus, the 
contract is collusion-proof. The reader should note that the result contained in Theorem 1 is not 
independent of the state probabilities. In particular, this result depends on the state probabilities in 
the manner specified above. Put differently, for the result in Theorem 1 to hold, we need PI > P2 
andp4 > P3 • 
Fourth, because the equilibrium transfers to the agent are identical, and because the agent 
always takes the first best action, the marginal rate of substitution between the transfer and the action 
always equals unity. Consequently, the requirements of the definition in section 2b are satisfied. 
I conclude that the contract specified by Theorem 1 is individually rational, incentive compatible, 
collusion-proof, and that it implements the first-best/full-information optimum. 
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